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Strategies to Fight Ad-sponsored Rivals
Abstract
We analyze the optimal strategy of a high-quality incumbent that faces a low-quality
ad-sponsored competitor. In addition to competing through adjustments of tactical
variables such as price or advertising intensity, we allow the incumbent to consider
changes in its business model. We consider four alternative business models, two pure
models (subscription-based and ad-sponsored) and two mixed models that are hybrids
of the two pure models. We show that the optimal response to an ad-sponsored rival
often entails business model reconfigurations, a phenomenon that we dub “competing
through business models.” We also find that when there is an ad-sponsored entrant,
the incumbent is more likely to prefer to compete through a pure, rather than a mixed,
business model because of cannibalization and endogenous vertical differentiation con-
cerns. We discuss how our study helps improve our understanding of notions of strategy,
business model, and tactics in the field of strategy.
1 Introduction
Ad-sponsored business models appear to be increasingly prevalent in today’s economy. Many
companies choose to finance themselves using ad revenues and offer their products or ser-
vices free to consumers. These products and services range from newspapers to software
applications and from television programs to online search.
The emergence of ad-sponsored entrants in various industries poses significant threats to
the incumbents in these markets whose business models are often based on subscriptions or
fees charged to their customers. For example, newly-launched music service providers such
as Imeem give users free access to ad-supported, streaming music files, while industry leaders
such as Apple’s iTunes music services and RealNetwork’s Rhapsody are fee or subscription-
based. NetZero offered free ad-sponsored dial-up internet access and attracted many users
away from AOL’s subscription-based dial-up service.
Ad-sponsored business models are not limited to Internet-related industries. Free ad-
sponsored broadcast television channels have been competing with subscription-based cable
channels such as HBO for many years. And Metro, the world’s largest newspaper mea-
sured by circulation, is free and ad-sponsored. It is published in more than 100 cities in 18
countries.1 In each city it enters, it competes with local newspapers sold at positive prices.
Faced with the threat from ad-sponsored entrants, incumbents must choose strategies to
respond. The New York Times Co., which owns The Boston Globe, bought a 49 percent stake
in Metro Boston in 2006. In September 2007, the company also stopped charging readers
to access certain articles on NYTimes.com and began to use ads exclusively to finance its
online news services. Recoletos, one of the biggest Spanish media groups, launched Que´!,
a free newspaper in 15 cities to compete against Metro Spain.2 Apple, on the other hand,
chose not to respond to ad-sponsored free music sites and continues its business as usual.
These empirical observations suggest that incumbents use a variety of measures to re-
spond to ad-sponsored rivals. They not only use tactics such as adjusting their prices, but
also consider the adoption of new business models by switching from subscription-based
models to ad-sponsored models or by extending their product lines to include ad-sponsored
versions of their offerings. Some of these strategic responses have not worked well. The New
York Times Co., for example, is planning to charge for access to some of its online content
once again.3
1Source: http://www.metro.lu/about/metro_facts, accessed April 2009.
2See Khanna et al. (2007).
3Source: http://www.watblog.com/2009/02/05/nytimes-plans-paid-subscription-for-online-
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How should an incumbent react to an ad-sponsored entrant? The goal of this research is
to develop an analytical framework to establish guidelines for incumbent firms facing these
issues. We consider a competitive setting with an incumbent that faces an ad-sponsored
entrant. Specifically, we set up a game where the the incumbent firm first chooses the
business model through which it would like to compete. We consider four alternative business
models:
• The pure-subscription-based model: the firm offers at positive price one product that
comes without ads.
• The pure-ad-sponsored model: the firm’s product comes with ads but it is given away
for free. We assume that ads have a detrimental effect on the product’s perceived
quality. For example, most people would prefer to watch movies without interruptions
for advertising.
• The mixed-single-product model: the firm’s product has advertisements and it is sold
at positive price.
• The mixed-product-line-extension model: In this case, the firm offers two products, a
high-quality product that, just as in the mixed-single-product model, is sold at positive
price and comes with a few ads, and a low-quality product that is ad-sponsored (has
many ads but is given away for free).
Table 1 presents some examples under each business model. Building on Ghemawat
(1991), we refer to the choice of business model as strategy : the business model is a set
of committed choices that lays the ground for the competitive interaction that will occur
between the incumbent and the ad-sponsored entrant down the line.
After the business model has been chosen, the incumbent and the entrant make tactical
choices simultaneously: the entrant chooses advertising intensity as it is assumed to compete
through a pure ad-sponsored business model, and the incumbent chooses price and/or adver-
tising intensity, depending on the business model through which it has decided to compete.
For example, if the incumbent competes through the pure-subscription-based model, then
it chooses price as tactics, and if the incumbent competes through the mixed-product-line-
extension model, it chooses price and advertising intensity for the high-quality product and
advertising intensity for the low-quality product.
content-again/, accessed April 2009.
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Business Models Examples
Pure-subscription-based iTunes or Rhapsody (audio and video distribution)
eHarmony (dating sites)
HBO (cable TV)
Dell (PCs)
Pure-ad-sponsored Metro (newspapers)
Free-pc (PCs)
Imeem (music distribution)
Blyk (mobile service)
Facebook (social networks)
ABS notebooks (notebooks for college students)
FreePaperCups.com (coffee cups)
ABC, MSNBC, Fox... (TV channels)
WARL, WAVM... (broadcasted radio stations)
Mixed-single-product Time (magazines)
Wall Street Journal (newspapers)
TNT (cable channels)
Ryanair (airlines)
Mixed-product-line-extension Recoletos (newspapers)
GMail (email)
Match.com (dating sites)
Pandora (music distribution)
Flickr (photo storage and management)
Table 1: Examples of Different Business Models
3
We study how the incumbent’s optimal strategy (choice of business model) and tactics
(choice of price and/or advertising intensity) is affected by: (a) the presence of the entrant,
(b) the prevailing advertising rates, and (c) the additional fixed costs of competing through
a mixed, as opposed to a pure, business model.
Our analysis reveals that the optimal strategic and tactical choices change dramatically
in the presence of an ad-sponsored rival. Compared to a situation where the incumbent is
a monopolist, when there is an ad-sponsored competitor the incumbent is more likely to
prefer to compete through a pure, rather than a mixed, business model. There are two
reasons for this. First, the presence of the ad-sponsored rival puts an upper bound on the
number of ads that an incumbent competing through a mixed-product-line-extension can
set. Therefore, the low-quality, ad-sponsored product that the incumbent offers cannot be of
very low quality (otherwise it obtains no sales) and, as a consequence, it cannibalizes sales
of the high-quality product. Given this, the mixed-product-line-extension model is inferior
to the pure-subscription-based model when the advertising rate is low.
Second, even if the incumbent can avoid cannibalization by using the mixed-single-product
model, the incumbent may still prefer to use the pure-subscription-based model. The reason
is that advertising intensities of the two firms are strategic substitutes. As the incumbent
increases the number of ads, the entrant decreases its advertising intensity and vertical differ-
entiation diminishes. This forces the incumbent to lower its price which ends up hurting its
profits. When the quality difference between the incumbent and entrant’s products is small
and the incumbent competes through the mixed-single-product model, we find the counter-
intuitive result that the incumbent’s (equilibrium) profits are decreasing in the advertising
rate!
We also find that there are situations where the best response to an ad-sponsored entrant
is to do nothing. That is, it may be optimal for the incumbent not to change its business
model and tactics. This happens only when the optimal business model under both monopoly
and duopoly is the pure-subscription-based model and the quality difference between the
incumbent and the entrant is large. In all other cases, even if the optimal business model
does not change following entry, optimal tactics change.
The entrant is pushed out of the market only when the incumbent competes through
a business model that has an ad-sponsored product.4 Otherwise, both firms coexist with
strictly positive profits. Eliminating the entrant is optimal only when the prevailing adver-
4The only two possibilities are: (a) the incumbent competes through the pure-ad-sponsored model or (b)
the incumbent competes through the mixed-product-line-extension model.
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tising rate is high. Therefore, the incumbent’s reaction to the entry by an ad-sponsored rival
is most aggressive when advertising rates are high. Ironically, this is the situation when,
absent the incumbent’s reaction, the entrant would have had the strongest incentives to
enter.
Our study is the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of the competition between
a free ad-sponsored entrant and an incumbent that has the option of choosing different
business models. Our analysis shows the importance of considering modifications to a firm’s
business model when deciding how to face competition. We quantify the additional profit
that the incumbent earns when, in addition to re-optimizing its tactics, it also takes into
consideration possible changes in the business model and show that the profit implications
of competing through business models could be substantial.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship of our paper
with the literature. Section 3 presents our model setup. Section 4 analyzes the monopoly
benchmark. Section 5 examines the duopoly case in which an incumbent competes with an
ad-sponsored entrant. Section 6 provides managerial implications. Section 7 discusses the
contribution of our study in improving our understanding of strategy and tactics. Section 8
concludes after suggesting some extensions to the analysis.
2 Related literature
The paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on
ad-sponsored business models. Prasad et al. (2003) and Gabszewicz et al. (2005) examine a
monopolist’s pricing decisions when it is ad-sponsored. Their results are akin to our mixed-
single-product model for a monopoly in that the monopoly will lower the subscription price as
the willingness to pay of the advertisers increases. Several studies (e.g., Steiner 1952; Beebe
1977; Spence and Owen 1977; Doyle 1998; Gal-Or and Dukes 2003; Bourreau 2003; Gab-
szewicz et al. 2006; Peitz and Valletti 2008) look at the product positioning of ad-sponsored
firms. In general, they find that with advertising, firms tend to provide less differentiated
products. These models often assume that products are horizontally differentiated and have
the same quality level. In contrast, we do not consider horizontal differentiation, and in-
stead focus on vertically differentiated products and allow firms to strategically decide the
level of product quality. Hence, our study complements these extant studies. Choi (2006)
and Crampes et al. (2009) examine entry of media firms that are financed both from ads
and subscriptions and find that with free entry, there may be excessive levels of entry in
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such markets. In their models, firms are symmetric and they adopt the same mixed-single-
product business model. While we only look at the competition between one incumbent and
one entrant, we allow them to use different business models. We discuss the case with more
than one entrant in Section 7.
The economic model we work with is close in spirit to the literature on product-line exten-
sion. Mussa and Rosen (1978) consider the product line decisions of a price-discriminating
monopolist able to offer a range of products of different qualities. They find that a monop-
olist may offer inefficiently low quality level to lower-value customers to reduce substitution
possibilities of higher-value customers. Deneckere and McAfee (1996) show how a monopoly
can degrade its product quality at no cost to create a low quality substitute to price discrimi-
nate. In our model, firms can use ads to degrade the quality of the product. Consistent with
Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Deneckere and McAfee (1996), we show that when product-line
extension is not costly, the monopolist indeed has an incentive to use ads to create a low-end
product. In addition, the monopolist has an incentive to introduce the maximum possible
number of ads to its low-end product to avoid cannibalizing its high-end product. Inter-
estingly, we find that the monopolist also has an incentive to introduce ads to its high-end
product, even at the cost of reducing the differentiation of its two products. In a duopoly
setting, Shaked and Sutton (1982) show that when each firm is allowed to offer one quality,
the two firms will want to maximize quality differentiation to soften price competition. In
contrast, as we show after introducing the ads, in our mixed-single-product-line model the
quality differentiation between the incumbent and the entrant is no longer maximized in
equilibrium.
Champsaur and Rochet (1989) extend Shaked and Sutton (1982)’s analysis by allowing
each firm to offer a whole range of products in a chosen interval of quality. They analyze
equilibria in which both firms are active by assuming non-overlapping quality intervals. As a
result, one firm does not have the option to push the other out of the market. In our model,
the range of quality the incumbent can choose for its product(s) overlaps with the range of
quality the entrant can choose. This setting allows us to analyze when the incumbent wants
to push the entrant out of the market. A few other studies such as Johnson and Myatt (2003)
and Gal-Or (1983) analyze settings in which vertically-differentiated firms set quantities of
their output to compete, while we analyze a model in which firms set subscription rate
and/or advertising intensities.
Our paper also contributes to an emerging literature in strategy that explores competitive
interaction between organizations with different business models. While there are several
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formal models of asymmetric competition that exist in strategy (differences in costs, resources
endowments or information, mainly), the asymmetries that this literature wrestles with are of
a different nature: firms with fundamentally different objective functions, opposed approaches
to competing, or different governance structures. Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006),
Economides and Katsamakas (2006) and Lee and Mendelson (2008) for example, study
mixed duopoly models in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with an open source
competitor that is committed to zero price. Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie (2007) study
competitive interactions between two complementors, Microsoft and Intel, with asymmetries
in their objectives functions stemming from technology—software vs. hardware. Seamans
(2009) looks at strategies used by incumbent cable TV firms to deter entry by public and
private entrants. Zhu (2008) examines networks’ incentives to establish compatibility under
subscription and ad-sponsored business models when the source of network differentiation
comes from users of the networks.
Interest in the study of competitive interactions between organizations with different
business models has increased in the last few years as new technologies, regulatory changes,
and new customer demands have allowed firms to implement new approaches to competing
in a wide range of industries spanning from airlines (e.g., Ryanair) to furniture (e.g., IKEA)
and from the circus (e.g., Cirque du Soleil) to software (e.g., open source projects). In fact,
many of the fastest-growing firms in the recent past appear to have taken advantage of
opportunities sparked by globalization, deregulation, or technological change to “compete
differently” and to innovate in their business models (see Kim and Mauborgne (2005) and
Markides (2008) for additional examples). So far, the literature has studied interactions
between exogenously given business models. This paper contributes to this literature by
endogeneizing the choice of business model: We allow the incumbent to choose the business
model with which it would like to fight a rival that competes with an ad-sponsored product.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on two-sided markets (e.g., Rochet and
Tirole 2003; Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Armstrong 2006; Hagiu 2009; Casadesus-Masanell
and Ruiz-Aliseda 2009). A market is two-sided when it is intermediated by a platform
which enables transactions between participants on both sides. In most applications in the
literature (e.g., the video game industry), the two sides attract each other.5 In contrast,
when a platform is ad-sponsored, consumers are attracted by the product offered by the
platform per se, rather than the ads, and they in general would prefer to watch fewer ads.
Our paper contributes to this literature by explicitly addressing the question of when it is
5That is, indirect network effects are positive.
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optimal for a firm to use a one-sided business model by excluding the side that produces the
negative effect.
3 The model
We consider two alternative industry structures. In the benchmark model of Section 4, we
study the case of a profit-maximizing monopolist that offers a high-quality product through
one of four alternative business models. In Section 5, we study the effects on the incumbent’s
optimal choice of business model and tactics when a free ad-sponsored rival enters the market.
On the demand side, there is one unit mass of consumers. Consumers are differentiated
by their type θ, which represents their marginal willingness to pay for product quality and
is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. If a consumer of type θ purchases a product of quality
q at price p, her utility is U(θ) = θq − p. We impose a non-negativity constraint on price
and normalize consumers’ utility from outside options to be zero. Each consumer adopts
one product only. In addition, we adopt a tie-breaking rule that if a consumer receives zero
utility from adopting a product, she will choose to adopt the product.
Let qi > 0 denote the (exogenous) quality of product i. qi is the maximum consumer
with type θ = 1 would ever be willing to pay for i if it contains no ads. Let Ai denote
the (endogenous) number of ads that product i carries. When a product is sponsored by
advertisers, the larger the number of consumers, the more attractive the product is for the
advertisers. Following Gabszewicz et al. (2004), we assume that the advertising fee charged
to each advertiser, ri, is an increasing linear function of the demand for the product, Di.
Mathematically, ri = αDi, where α > 0 and is the (per consumer) advertising rate charged
to each advertiser.
Consumers have to view ads that come with the product. Several recent work on media
industries characterize advertising as a nuisance (e.g., Anderson and Coate 2005). Empirical
studies in the television industry and the magazine industry (Wilbur 2008; Depken and
Wilson 2004) find that ads indeed reduce viewers’ utilities. Hence, we assume that the
total nuisance cost of the ads is βA2i , where β > 0. The functional form implies that the
marginal disutility of ads increases with advertising intensity. Moreover, the first few ads
are tolerated well by consumers but as more and more ads are shown, consumers become
increasingly irritated by them.
In summary, a consumer of type θ receives utility U(θ) = θ(qi − βA2i ) from product i.
We refer to qi−βA2i as the net quality of product i after taking the nuisance cost of ads into
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consideration.
As mentioned above, we consider four possible business models: a pure-subscription-
based model, a pure-ad-sponsored model, and two mixed models in which the firm makes
money from both subscription fees and ad revenues. We normalize the fixed cost of competing
through a pure business model to zero and denote by f ≥ 0 the additional fixed cost incurred
when a mixed business model is employed.6 Finally, we assume, for simplicity, that the
marginal cost of producing the product or introducing an ad is zero.
4 Monopoly benchmark
We begin by studying the optimal strategy of a monopolist with a product of quality qh. The
timing is as follows. The monopolist first chooses the business model. After the business
model is in place, the monopolist makes its tactical decisions: price ph and/or advertising
intensity Ah (depending on the business model used).
4.1 Four business models
Before deriving the optimal strategy and tactics for the monopolist, we need to introduce
our formalizations of the four business models.
Consistent with the common use of the expression, we think of a business model as “the
logic of the firm, the way it operates and how it creates value for its stakeholders”(Baden-
Fuller et al. 2008). To be able to work formally with business models, we represent them
in the form of simple profit functions. Profit functions are extreme reduced form represen-
tations of actual business models. For example, while we represent the pure-ad-sponsored
business model through profit function piAh = αAh, behind this simple expression there is an
elaborate activity system that includes: product distribution activities, incentive systems,
hiring policies, procurement contracts, information systems, and the like. We discuss this
issue at length in Section 7.
4.1.1 Pure-subscription-based model
In the pure-subscription-based model, the monopolist prices its product at ph. Let θ
∗ be the
consumer who is indifferent from purchasing the product and not purchasing it. Thus, θ∗ is
6It is reasonable to expect that dealing with both advertisers and consumers will be more costly: As the
two groups are very different and do not overlap with each other, there will be little economy of scope. On
the other hand, it is trivial to generalize the analysis to the case f < 0.
9
implicitly defined by θ∗qh − ph = 0. Consumers with type θ ≥ θ∗ will purchase the product
and the rest will not purchase it. The profit is:
piSh = (1− θ∗)ph. (1)
4.1.2 Pure-ad-sponsored model
In this case, the monopolist offers the product for free to consumers, i.e., ph = 0, and makes
money exclusively from advertisers.7 As ph = 0, all consumers will adopt the product as
long as qh − βA2h ≥ 0 and none will adopt the product otherwise. Hence, the profit of the
monopolist is:
piAh = αAh (2)
s.t. qh − βA2h ≥ 0.
4.1.3 Mixed-single-product model
The monopolist offers a single product at a positive price, ph > 0, and at the same time
introduces Ah ads with the product. The consumer of type θ receives a utility of U(θ) =
θ(qh−βA2h)−ph. The type of the indifferent consumer between purchasing and not purchasing
the product, θ∗, is thus defined by U(θ∗) = 0. The profit of the monopolist is:
piMSh = (1− θ∗)(ph + αAh)− f (3)
s.t. 0 ≤ θ∗ ≤ 1, qh − βA2h ≥ 0.
This business model is meaningful only when Ah > 0 and ph > 0. Clearly, if Ah = 0
then the business model is pure-subscription-based (as opposed to the mixed-single-product
model) and if ph = 0 then the business model is pure-ad-sponsored (as opposed to the
mixed-single-product model). As argued above, the activity system supporting the pure-
subscription-based model or the pure-ad-sponsored model are different (and less costly) than
that supporting the mixed-single-product model.
Notice that as ph > 0, θ
∗ > 0 and hence not all consumers will adopt the product. For
7Given our assumption of zero marginal cost of production, it happens that the pure-ad-sponsored model
has ph = mc = 0. We should stress, however, that the distinctive feature of the pure-ad-sponsored business
model is that revenue accrues from ads only. Therefore, even if mc > 0, the correct specification would have
ph = 0. Assuming mc > 0 complicates the analysis because additional corners must be considered and it
does not affect our results qualitatively.
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each consumer adopting the product, the monopolist makes money from selling the product
and also displaying ads.
4.1.4 Mixed-product-line-extension model
In the mixed-product-line-extension model, the monopolist offers two products, h and h′.
The first product, h, is priced at ph and comes with Ah ads. The second product, h
′, comes
with A′h ads and is free. The most profitable way for the monopolist to come up with an
ad-sponsored product h′ is by just adding ads to h. While the monopolist could create a
different, brand-new h′, it would prefer to use ads to lower the quality of h as ads will bring
additional profit.
In this case, the indifferent consumer between h and h′ is determined by: θ∗(qh−βA2h)−
ph = θ
∗(qh − βA′2h ). The profit is:
piMEh = (1− θ∗)(ph + αAh) + αA′hθ∗ − f (4)
s.t. 0 ≤ θ∗ ≤ 1, qh − βA′2h ≥ 0
This business model is meaningful only when A′h > Ah ≥ 0, ph > 0 and qh − βA′2h ≥ 0.
Note that if A′h ≤ Ah, then nobody will buy h at a positive price because h′ is of at least
as much quality and is offered for free, and the model effectively becomes the pure-ad-
sponsored model. And if ph = 0, then nobody will adopt h
′ (even if free) because h is of
higher quality and it is also free, and the model effectively becomes the pure-ad-sponsored
model. If qh− βA′2h < 0, then product h′ is not active and we have the mixed-single-product
model. Also, if A′h = Ah = 0, then it is as if there was one product only offered through the
pure-subscription-based model.
While it may seem as if the pure-ad-sponsored, the pure-subscription-based and mixed-
single-product business models are special cases of the mixed-produce-line extension model
(as if they were points on a continuum), once we zoom down to the concrete system of
activities that those profit functions aim to capture it becomes clear that they are not points
in a continuum. Put differently, real companies do not think of their profit functions as
completely “plastic.” For example, if one initially competes through the pure-subscription-
based model and considers putting “a little bit of ads,” or introducing an ad-sponsored
product, he will likely need some important changes in his activity system (activities to
negotiate with advertisers, collect ad revenues, access to different distribution channels...).
In other words, he will need to conduct activities that he did not perform (or that he
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configured differently) when competing through the pure-subscription-based model.
4.2 Optimal strategy, business model, and tactics
Having presented the four business models, we now proceed to solving for the optimal tactical
choices implied by each model and for the monopolist’s optimal business model. We solve
the optimization problem backwards: We first find the optimal tactical choices and later
study the optimal choice of business model.
4.2.1 Monopoly tactics
We use the term tactics to refer to the choices that the firm makes after the business model
has been chosen. We note that the tactical options available to the firm depend on the
business model under consideration.
The following proposition summarizes the optimal tactical choices for each business model
that we consider.
Proposition 1 The optimal price and number of ads under each business model are:
• Pure-subscription-based model: ph = qh/2.
• Pure-ad-sponsored model: Ah = (qh/β)1/2.
• Mixed-single-product model:
Ah solves A
3
hβ
2 + qh(α− Ahβ) = 0.8
ph = (qh − βA2h − αAh)/2.
• Mixed-product-line-extension model:
A′h = (qh/β)
1/2.
Ah =
1
2
((A′h(4α + A
′
hβ)/β)
1/2 − A′h).
ph =
1
2
(A′h − Ah)(α + (Ah + A′h)β).
Proof. We provide all the proofs in the appendix.
The intuitions for these results are as follows:
8The solution to Ah is too lengthy to be shown here.
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Pure-subscription-based model. The monopolist trades off demand against mark-up. It is
well-known that when the demand function is linear and marginal cost is zero, the optimal
solution has a price equal to 1
2
the choke price and half of the market is served.
Pure-ad-sponsored model. The monopolist introduces the maximum number of ads possible
making sure that the resulting quality is not so low that there is no willingness to pay.
Because ph = 0, as long as qh− βA2h ≥ 0, every consumer buys the product regardless of the
number of ads that it contains. Thus profit is maximized at Ah = (qh/β)
1/2.
We note also that as β increases, the equilibrium Ah is smaller. Clearly, if consumers
become easily irritated by ads, the number of ads that results in zero net quality is smaller.
Mixed-single-product model. Given Ah, the net quality of the product is qh − βA2h. A
monopolist earning profits from subscription only with a product of quality qh− βA2h would
charge a price of pˆh = (qh− βA2h)/2. However, the optimal price in the case of a monopolist
that also earns profits from advertising is ph = (qh−βA2h−αAh)/2 < pˆh. The reason is that
with advertising the firm considers the profits accrued from both sides of the market. To
earn more from advertising, the firm must decrease ph to increase demand. In addition, as α
increases, ph decreases. This inverse relationship between advertising rate and subscription
price is also found in other model setups (e.g., Armstrong 2006).
The equilibrium Ah is increasing in α. As α increases, the monopolist will typically
decrease ph to increase the number of adopters of the ad-sponsored product and earn even
more from the advertisers. Less expected, perhaps, is the fact that there is a discontinuity
in the equilibrium advertising intensity Ah when considered a function of α. When α grows,
Ah increases and ph decreases. Before ph reaches zero, the monopolist will want to increase
discretely the number of ads to the point that the net quality of h is zero. As discussed
above, at this point the mixed-single-product model is not meaningful and the relevant
business model has become the pure-ad-sponsored model.
Mixed-product-line-extension model. The ad-sponsored product has the lowest possible qual-
ity in equilibrium. In other words, A′h is such that the willingness to pay for the low-quality
product is zero. Therefore the individuals that consume the ad-sponsored product would
not have bought the high-quality product had the ad-sponsored product not existed. As a
consequence, there is no cannibalization between the two products.
When α is sufficiently large (α ≥ 2(βqh)1/2), the optimal ph is zero and all the profit
comes from the ads. Of course, in this case the monopolist is effectively offering one product
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only (both products are identical). Thus, when α is large, the mixed-product-line extension
model becomes the pure-ad-sponsored model.
When β grows, the monopolist is better off reducing both Ah and A
′
h (for the same reason
as in the pure-ad-sponsored model).
4.2.2 Monopoly strategy
We use the term strategy to refer to the choice of business model by the monopolist. An
optimal strategy takes into account that each business model leads to different equilibrium
tactical choices. We now characterize the monopolist’s optimal strategy through a series of
simple lemmas.
Lemma 1 When f = 0, the two mixed models dominate the pure-subscription-based model.
The reason is that the marginal effect of ads on consumer utility evaluated at Ah = 0
is zero. On the other hand, the marginal revenue of ads is constant and equal to α, which
is assumed to be positive. Therefore, when the additional cost of using a mixed model f is
zero, it is always optimal to have a few ads, even if α is very small. Of course, with a large α
the relative advantage of the mixed models over the pure-subscription-based model is even
larger.
Lemma 2 The mixed-product-line-extension model dominates the mixed-single-product model.
Intuitively, under the mixed-single-product model not all consumers adopt the product
because the price is positive. The monopolist could improve its payoff by offering an ad-
sponsored free product that gives zero utility. The ad-sponsored product does not cannibalize
the sales of the high quality product. Those who choose the outside option would now adopt
the ad-sponsored product and would bring ad revenue to the monopolist.
Lemma 3 When α is sufficiently large, the pure-ad-sponsored model is always optimal; when
α is sufficiently low, the pure-ad-sponsored model is never optimal.
Clearly, the monopolist prefers to earn all profits from the advertising side of the market
when α is large. The business model where profits from advertising are largest is the pure-
ad-sponsored model because the optimal tactics implied maximize the volume of customers.
To understand the second part of the lemma, note that the monopolist can always guarantee
a profit of qh/4 > 0 by competing through the pure-subscription-based model. However,
profits under the pure-ad-sponsored model converge to zero when α approaches 0.
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Lemma 4 When f > 0 and α is low, the pure-subscription-based model is optimal.
Given Lemmas 2 and 3, when α is low, the only business models that need to be considered
are the pure-subscription-based model and the mixed-product-line-extension model. Notic-
ing that the additional profit from advertising in the mixed-product-line-extension model
converges to zero when α approaches 0, f > 0 renders that model inferior to the pure-
subscription-based model when α is low.
Figure 1 summarizes the optimal strategy for the monopolist as a function of α and f .9
Having established the benchmark monopoly case, we proceed to the analysis of the duopoly.
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Figure 1: Optimal business model in the monopoly case.
5 Duopoly
We now examine the firm’s optimal strategy and tactics in a competitive environment.
Specifically, we examine the optimal strategy of an incumbent that faces an ad-sponsored
entrant. We assume that the entrant faces no entry costs and, thus, that it enters as long as
the profits that it expects to earn are greater than zero.
9In this figure, the parameter values are: qh = 3 and β = 1.
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Let the quality of the entrant’s product be ql < qh. Because the entrant uses a pure-
ad-sponsored business model, its product is given away for free. Let Al be the amount of
ads the entrant introduces. On the one hand, the entrant would like to have many ads; on
the other hand, having many ads reduces the product’s quality and, as a result, reduces the
number of consumers adopting it. The entrant also needs to take the incumbent’s responses
into consideration when choosing the number of ads. Note that consumers will consider the
entrant’s product only if ql − βA2l ≥ 0.
We again examine the four possible business models that the incumbent may want to
adopt: the pure-subscription-based model, the pure-ad-sponsored model, the mixed-single-
product model, and the mixed-product-line-extension model.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the entrant decides whether to enter or not.
Second, the incumbent chooses a business model. Third, tactical choices are made by both
the entrant and the incumbent, and demand and profits are realized.
5.1 Four business models
We now present our formalizations of the four business models.
5.1.1 Pure-subscription-based model
The incumbent maximizes profits by setting ph and the entrant maximizes profits by setting
Al subject to the constraint that ql − βA2l ≥ 0. As the entrant product is free, consumers
who do not adopt product h will adopt product l. The type of the indifferent consumer
between the two products, θ∗, is defined by θ∗qh − ph = θ∗(ql − βA2l ).
Profits of the incumbent and the entrant are:
piSh = (1− θ∗)ph.
piSl = αθ
∗Al.
s.t. 0 ≤ θ∗ ≤ 1, ql − βA2l ≥ 0.
5.1.2 Pure-ad-sponsored model
When both the incumbent and the entrant provide free products, all consumers will buy the
product with higher net quality. This competitive situation is similar to Bertrand competi-
tion, except that now the two firms are setting the number of ads, not prices.
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The profits are:
piAh =
αAh if qh − βA2h ≥ ql − βA2l0 otherwise.
piAl =
0 if qh − βA2h ≥ ql − βA2lαAl otherwise.
s.t. qh − βA2h ≥ 0 and ql − βA2l ≥ 0.
Note that we are assuming that when both products, h and l, are of the same quality,
consumers prefer the incumbent’s offering.10
5.1.3 Mixed-single-product model
The incumbent product now comes with ads, Ah, and is priced at ph > 0. The indifferent
consumer is defined by θ∗(qh − βA2h)− ph = θ∗(ql − βA2l ). Hence, the profits are:
piMSh = (1− θ∗)(ph + αAh)− f.
piMSl = θ
∗αAl.
s.t. 0 ≤ θ∗ ≤ 1, qh − βA2h ≥ 0, ql − βA2l ≥ 0.
Just as in the monopoly case, for this business model to be meaningful, we need that
ph > 0 and Ah > 0. Otherwise, one of the pure business models is the effective one.
5.1.4 Mixed-product-line-extension model
The incumbent introduces two products, product h that is both subscription and ad-based
and product h′ that is purely ad-sponsored. Suppose that the advertising intensities A′h and
Al are such that the entrant is pushed out of the market. Then, consumers either buy the high
quality product of the incumbent or consume the free ad-sponsored product of the incumbent.
In this case, the indifferent consumer θ∗ is determined by θ∗(qh−βA2h)− ph = θ∗(qh−βA′2h ).
Suppose, instead, that the advertising intensities A′h and Al are such that the entrant is
not pushed out of the market. Then, consumers either buy the high quality product of
the incumbent or consume the free ad-sponsored product of the entrant. In this case, the
10As qh > ql, the incumbent could always set its net quality, qh − βA2h, at ql − βA2l +  to attract all
consumers.
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indifferent consumer θ∗∗ is determined by θ∗∗(qh − βA2h)− ph = θ∗∗(ql − βA2l ).
As product h is not free, we must have that Ah < A
′
h. That is, the net quality of h has
to be greater than that of h′. Otherwise, product h will have no demand. The profits are:
piMEh =
(1− θ∗)(ph + αAh) + θ∗(αA′h)− f if qh − βA′2h ≥ ql − βA2l(1− θ∗∗)(ph + αAh)− f otherwise.
piMEl =
0 if qh − βA′2h ≥ ql − βA2lαθ∗∗Al otherwise.
s.t. 0 ≤ θ∗ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ θ∗∗ ≤ 1, qh − βA′2h ≥ 0, ql − βA2l ≥ 0, and Ah < A′h.
This business model is meaningful only when ph > 0, Ah > 0, and A
′
h > 0.
5.2 Optimal strategy, business model, and tactics
We proceed to finding the equilibrium tactical choices of the incumbent and the entrant and
the incumbent’s equilibrium choice of business model. We look for the sub-game perfect
equilibria of the game and, thus, proceed to solving it by backwards induction.
5.2.1 Duopoly tactics
The following proposition shows the equilibrium tactics for each business model.
Proposition 2 The optimal price and number of ads under each business model are:
• Pure-subscription-based model:
We may have a corner solution in which ql− βA2l = 0 or an interior solution in which
ql − βA2l > 0.
At the interior solution, ph = qh− ql and Al = ( qh−qlβ )1/2. This happens when qh < 2ql.
At the corner solution, ph = qh/2 and Al = (ql/β)
1/2. This happens when qh ≥ 2ql.
• Pure-ad-sponsored model:
Ah = ((qh − ql)/β)1/2.
Al = 0. The entrant is pushed out the market.
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• Mixed-single-product model:
We may have a corner solution in which ql− βA2l = 0 or an interior solution in which
ql − βA2l > 0.
At the interior solution, Ah and Al solve the following system:
11
(qh − ql)/β + A2l =
A3h
Ah−α/β
Al = ((qh − ql − A2hβ)/β)1/2
,
and ph =
1
2
(qh − ql − αAh − β(A2h − A2l )) .
At the corner solution, Ah solves: A
3
hβ
2 + qh(α− Ahβ) = 0,
Al = (ql/β)
1/2, and
ph = (qh − Ah(α + Ahβ))/2.
• Mixed-product-line-extension model:
A′h = ((qh − ql)/β)1/2.
Ah =
1
2
((A′h(4α + A
′
hβ)/β)
1/2 − A′h).
ph =
1
2
(A′h − Ah)(α + β(Ah + A′h)).
Al = 0. The entrant is pushed out the market.
We now present the intuitions behind these results:
Pure-subscription-based model. The optimal tactics of the incumbent depend on whether the
entrant sets its number of ads at the corner or not (Al = (ql/β)
1/2 or Al > (ql/β)
1/2), which
in turn depends on the exogenous vertical differentiation between the incumbent’s and the
entrant’s products. Recall that the entrant’s profits increase with its market share and the
number of ads its product has. When the entrant’s product is of very low quality (qh ≥ 2ql),
it is best for it to maximize the number of ads because its market share, θ∗ = ph
qh−ql+βAl2 ,
is insensitive to the amount of ads that it offers (the derivative of θ∗ with respect to Al
approaches zero as the difference between qh and ql grows). On the other hand, if its quality
is close to the high quality one (qh < 2ql), θ
∗ is sensitive to the number of ads and it makes
sense for the entrant to reduce the number of ads to gain some market share.
11The solution to Ah is too lengthy to be shown here.
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When qh ≥ 2ql, there is no cannibalization between the two products: ql−βA2l = 0. The
indifferent consumer obtains zero utility. When qh < 2ql, the net quality of the entrant in
equilibrium is positive: ql − βA2l = ql − qh/2 > 0. The indifferent consumer has positive
utility from both products. Note that the solution when qh ≥ 2ql is the same as in the
monopoly case for the incumbent. This result suggests that the incumbent may not have to
adjust its tactics when facing an ad-sponsored rival.
It is interesting to note that θ∗ = 1/2 in both cases. That is, the incumbent and the
entrant always split the market equally, regardless of their quality difference. Given any Al,
the residual demand for product h is Dh = 1 − θ∗ = 1 − phqh−ql+βA2l . The marginal revenue
implied by this demand function equals marginal cost (which is zero) at Dh =
1
2
regardless
of the value of Al. Of course, the equilibrium ph changes with Al, and so does the incumbent
profit, but the equilibrium Dh does not change.
Pure-ad-sponsored model. The incumbent uses the free ad-sponsored product to “kill” the
entrant. This means that the incumbent cannot introduce too many ads as it has to offer at
least the same amount of utility as the entrant without ads because the entrant will respond
by lowering the amount of ads to survive. Hence, the optimal amount of ads is constrained
by qh−βA2h ≥ ql. Under this constraint, all consumers will adopt product h. Therefore, it is
in the interest of the incumbent to maximize Ah, subject to the constraint that qh−βA2h ≥ ql.
Mixed-single-product model. As the incumbent product is not free, consumers with low θ
will not buy from the incumbent. As long as the entrant’s product offers positive utility,
these consumers will adopt the entrant’s product. As a result, both the incumbent and the
entrant coexist in equilibrium.
Similarly to the pure-subscription-based-model, the solution may be at a corner where
the entrant sets the maximum number of ads (Al = (ql/β)
1/2) such that the utility for its
product is zero or it may be interior (Al < (ql/β)
1/2). When qh ≤ 2ql, we are at the interior
solution and the entrant’s product offers strictly positive utility. The indifferent consumer
thus gets positive utility. Surprisingly, in this case, the derivative of piMSh w.r.t. α is negative.
Lemma 5 Under the mixed-single-product model, when we have interior solutions, the in-
cumbent’s profits, piMSh , decrease with the advertising rate, α; when we have corner solu-
tions, the incumbent’s profits, piMSh , increase with the advertising rate, α. In addition, when
qh ≤ 2ql, we will always have interior solutions; when qh > 2ql and α is smaller than a given
threshold, α∗ > 0, we will have corner solutions.
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To understand this result, recall that when we have interior solutions, the entrant’s best-
response function is Al = ((qh − ql − A2hβ)/β)1/2. Note that Al does not depend on α
directly but indirectly through Ah. In particular, increases in Ah result in decreases in Al.
It is easy to see that Ah increases with α. As a result, Al will decrease with α through its
inverse relationship with Ah. Therefore, as α increases, the vertical differentiation between
the two products diminishes and the increased intensity of competition lowers the profit for
the incumbent. The entrant’s profit, however, increases with α. The interior case happens
when Al is less than (ql/β)
1/2, the maximum number of ads that the entrant can possibly
have. A sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be interior is qh < 2ql.
The corner solution happens when the quality difference is large (i.e., qh > 2ql). When
qh > 2ql, the unconstrained profit-maximizing Al (i.e., ((qh − ql −A2hβ)/β)1/2) would exceed
the maximum number of ads that the entrant can possible have (i.e., (ql/β)
1/2). In this case,
the entrant chooses to set Al at (ql/β)
1/2, and the indifferent consumer receives zero utility.
When at the corner solution, the number of ads and the price that the incumbent sets are
the same as in the monopoly mixed-single-product model because there is no interaction
between the entrant and the incumbent. Moreover, the derivative of pih w.r.t. α is positive.
The entrant’s profits, pil = α(ql/β)
1/2, also increase with α. But as α keeps increasing, the
entrant eventually finds it optimal to have fewer ads to enlarge its market share and we move
into the interior case. Once we are in the interior case, the incumbent’s profits decrease with
α while the entrant’s profits still increase with α. (The upper bound to the green area in
Figure 4 illustrates this situation.)
Mixed-product-line-extension model. In this case, the entrant will be pushed out of the market
by the pure-ad-sponsored product of the incumbent for the same reason as in the pure-ad-
sponsored business model. All consumers adopt the incumbent’s products. In order to push
the entrant out, the net quality of the pure-ad-sponsored product, qh−βA′2h , has to be no less
than ql. On the other hand, in order to minimize cannibalization between incumbent’s two
products, the incumbent wants to set A′h such that the net quality of the pure-ad-sponsored
product to be as low as possible. Hence, A′h is determined by qh − βA′2h = ql. The utility of
the indifferent consumer over the two products is thus θ∗ql > 0.
We also note that the equilibrium Ah is greater than zero. That is, it is always opti-
mal for the incumbent to introduce some ads with product h. Hence, this business model
dominates the one where the incumbent offers a pure-subscription-based product and a pure-
ad-sponsored product.12
12This is the reason why we do not consider this business model in this paper.
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The entrant and the incumbent co-exist in the equilibrium under the pure-subscription-
based model and mixed-single-product model. The entrant is pushed out only when the
the incumbent competes with an ad-sponsored product (pure-ad-sponsored model or mixed-
product-line-extension model).
5.2.2 Duopoly strategy
We now characterize the incumbent’s optimal strategy when there is an ad-sponsored entrant
through a series of simple lemmas.
Lemma 6 When α is small, either the pure-subscription-based or the mixed-single-product
model is optimal; when α is large, the pure-ad-sponsored model is optimal.
When α is small, the incumbent prefers to coexist with the entrant as the additional ad
profit from its ad-sponsored product after killing the entrant would be small and there is
also cannibalization in the case of the mixed-product-line-extension model; but when α is
large, the incumbent has incentives to push the entrant out as it wants the market share
from the entrant to earn ad profit even at the cost of cannibalization.
Lemma 7 Compared to the monopoly case, neither the mixed-single-product model nor the
mixed-product-line-extension model dominates the pure-subscription-based model for all α
when f = 0.
As Lemma 5 indicates, when qh ≤ 2ql the incumbent’s profit decreases with α when
competing through the mixed-single-product model. The incumbent profit is maximized
when the advertising rate approaches zero in this case. But when α = 0, the incumbent
is effectively using the pure-subscription-based model. Hence, the pure-subscription-based
model provides greater profit than the mixed-single-product model.
In the case of mixed-product-line-extension model, the incumbent uses the free ad-
sponsored product to “kill” the entrant. This means that the incumbent cannot introduce
too many ads to its ad-sponsored product. As a result, there is cannibalization between
the incumbent’s two products, which lowers the profit for the incumbent. Cannibalization
becomes more intense when ql approaches qh. Thus, competing through a pure-subscription-
based model may be better when the effect of cannibalization dominates the additional ad
profit from the pure-ad-sponsored product of the incumbent.
When f > 0, the two mixed business models become even less desirable.
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Lemma 7 implies that the pure-subscription-based model may be the superior business
model when α > 0 and f = 0. This was never the case in the monopoly setting.
Lemma 8 Compared to the monopoly case, the mixed-product-line-extension model no longer
dominates the mixed-single-product model.
The intuition is the same as in Lemma 7. Compared to the monopoly case, we now have
cannibalization between the two products offered by the incumbent in the mixed-product-
line-extension model. When the cannibalization is intense (this happens when qh and ql
are close), the mixed-single-product model may be better. This was never the case in the
monopoly setting.
Lemma 9 When α is sufficiently large, the pure-ad-sponsored model is the optimal business
model. When f is sufficiently large, only one of the two pure business models can be optimal.
When α is very large, the incumbent wants to give away the product for free to maximize
its market share. The situation is similar to the monopoly but because the incumbent needs
to make sure that the entrant is pushed out, there is a tighter constraint on the amount
of ads that the incumbent can include with the product. The profit is lower than in the
monopoly case. The second part of the lemma is straightforward as f is incurred for mixed
models only.
Proposition 3 When qh ≤ 2ql, three possible business models might be optimal (the one
dominated is the mixed-single-product model); When qh > 2ql, all four business models may
be optimal.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate our results.13
Comparing Figures 2 and 3, we see that depending on qh and ql, the set of possibly
optimal business models changes. When qh ≤ 2ql, the equilibrium tactics in the mixed-
single-product model are such that ql−βA2l > 0 (interior solution). As argued above, in this
case, the mixed-single-product model is dominated by the pure-subscription-based model
and, thus, we are left with three possibly optimal business models.
The shape of the region over which the mixed-single-product model is optimal (Figures 3
and 4) is interesting. When qh > 2ql and α is small, we are at the corner (ql − βA2l = 0). In
13The three figures have qh = 3 and β = 1. Only ql varies. For Figure 2, ql = 1.6. For Figure 3, ql = 1.3.
And for Figure 4, ql = 1.49.
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Figure 2: Optimal business models in duopoly when qh ≤ 2ql.
this case, because there is no strategic reaction by the entrant, as α increases, the profit can
only raise for the incumbent. As α grows, the incumbent increases its advertising intensity
and the vertical differentiation between both products becomes smaller. Two cases may
happen as α increases. When qh  2ql, before we reach the point where the entrant has an
incentive to lower Al to gain share, the incumbent finds that α is large enough to introduce
an ad-sponsored product to push the entrant out of the market. Thus, in this case, whenever
the incumbent competes through the mixed-single-product model, we are at the corner were
willingness to pay for the entrant’s product is zero. Figure 3 illustrates this case.
The second case happens when the quality difference is not very large (i.e., qh > 2ql).
In this case, as α grows, the point where the incumbent finds that α is large enough to
introduce an ad-sponsored product to push the entrant out occurs after the point where the
entrant has an incentive to lower Al. From this point on, we are at an interior solution and
the incumbent profit decreases with α. Figure 4 illustrates this situation.
We end our discussion by noting that, as illustrated in Figure 4, for fixed f , as α increases,
a pure-subscription-based model may initially be optimal, then the mixed-single-product
model becomes superior, but for even larger α the pure-subscription-based model is optimal
once again. As α keeps growing, the mixed-product-line-extension model is preferred. And
when α is very large, the pure-ad-sponsored model yields the largest profit.
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Figure 3: Optimal business models in duopoly when qh  2ql.
6 Managerial implications
We now explore the implications of our work for management practice. In Section 6.1 we
show that the optimal response to an ad-sponsored entrant often leads to increased strategic
focus. In Section 6.2, we compute the value of reconfigurations in the firm’s business model.
In Section 6.3, we present a simple two-by-two matrix that summarizes our results. Finally,
in Section 6.4 we revisit some of the examples that we have used to motivate our analysis.
6.1 Increased strategic focus
We have shown that when the incumbent competes through the mixed-product-line-extension
model, it winds up serving the entire market. Therefore, the mixed-product-line-extension
model results in a situation where the incumbent firm is “all things to all people.” Our model
suggests that while a monopoly will often find it optimal to adopt this model, a profit-
maximizing duopolist incumbent will be less likely to compete through a mixed business
model.
To see this, compare the regions in (α, f) space where each business model is optimal.
Figure 1 shows the region for the monopolist and Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the regions for
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Figure 4: Optimal business models in duopoly when qh > 2ql.
the incumbent duopolist. Figure 5 superimposes Figures 1 on top of 3.14 It reveals that the
region of parameters such that it is optimal to compete through a mixed business model
shrinks when there is a competitor that competes through a pure ad-sponsored business
model. That is, a pure business model becomes more desirable when there is a potential
entrant that is ad-sponsored. This effect becomes stronger as ql approaches qh. The reason is
that, compared to the monopoly case, in the duopoly case the use of a mixed model implies
either cannibalization (in the case of the mixed-product-line-extension model) or erosion of
vertical differentiation (in the case of the mixed-single-product model). These two forces
reduce incumbent’s incentives to using mixed business models.
We conclude that increased focus and narrower scope (by competing through a pure
business model or a mixed business model that does not serve the entire market) is more
likely to be optimal when facing an ad-sponsored rival compared to the monopoly situation.
Remark 1 follows directly:
Remark 1 If it is not optimal for the monopolist to compete through a mixed business model,
14Of course, the same conclusions can be drawn by superimposing Figures 1 and 2, or Figures 1 and 4.
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Figure 5: Monopoly and duopoly regions.
it is even less optimal to do so in the presence of an ad-sponsored rival.
Interestingly, that firms should not try to be “all things to all people” was identified first
by Porter (1996). Porter’s argument is that when a firm attempts to make everyone happy,
its activity system will likely lead to internal inconsistencies resulting in a loss of competitive
advantage.
Our reasoning is different. The suboptimality of mixed-product-line-extension business
model is due to the nature of the competitive interactions that ensue when there is an
ad-sponsored rival. While the mixed-product-line-extension model is often optimal when
there is no competitor, duopolistic interactions result in damaging product cannibalization
that hurt the attractiveness of the mixed business model. Thus, our analysis delivers an
alternative/complementary theory as to why being “all things to all people” is often not
wise.
6.2 Competing through business models
Our work suggests that the optimal response of an incumbent when an ad-sponsored entrant
emerges often involves reconfiguration of its business model. We now illustrate quantita-
tively the cost of not competing through business models. Suppose that the incumbent
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reacts by modifying its tactics but not by changing its business model. We ask: how much
more profit could have been obtained if the incumbent had also considered business model
reconfigurations?
Figure 6 shows the region (α, f) where the incumbent should have (optimally) reconfig-
ured its business model after the entry of the ad-sponsored rival.15
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Figure 6: An incumbent who reacts to the entrant through tactics only.
Let pimax be the incumbent’s profits when it competes through business models; that is,
the profits when the incumbent makes use of strategy and tactics to fight the ad-sponsored
rival. Let piconstrained be the incumbent’s profits when it competes through tactics only; that
is, the profits when the incumbent does not consider changing its business model but reacts
by optimally changing its tactical choices.
Figure 7 plots percent loss in profit, which is defined as
% loss in profit =
pimax − piconstrained
pimax
.
The plot shows that the profit implications of not considering business model reconfigu-
rations may be substantial. In this simple example, the profit loss ranges from 0% to about
15In this particular example, β = 1, qh = 3, and ql = 1.3.
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Figure 7: Profit implications of not competing through business models.
6.3 A two-by-two
Our theoretical results can be easily embedded into simple two-by-two matrices, a format
that managers understand well. Figure 8 shows “two-by-two versions” of Figures 1, 2, and
3.16 Specifically, the horizontal dimension α/β captures the attractiveness of bundling the
product with ads. A large value of α/β means either that the advertising rates are large or
that consumers are not too bothered by the ads (or both). The vertical dimension is f , the
additional cost of running a mixed model. The matrix on the top row corresponds to the
monopoly. The matrixes on the bottom row are for the duopoly. The matrix on the left is
for the case qh < 2ql and the one on the right for the case qh > 2ql.
Simple two-by-two matrices are helpful because practitioners often do not know the exact
values of parameters (such as α, β, or f) but have a good idea of their orders of magnitude.
In addition, it may be difficult for managers to foresee the full implications (including the
equilibrium tactics) of competing through business models that they have not employed in
the past. The matrices provide simple advice grounded on careful theory development that
managers may consider when facing a new ad-sponsored entrant.
16The insight from Figure 4 is essentially the same as that of Figure 3.
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Figure 8: Optimal business models.
The most important implication of these matrices is that there is one cell where the
recommended course of action changes drastically depending on whether there is an ad-
sponsored rival or not and on the relative values of qh and ql.
17 We are in this interesting cell
when the additional cost of running a mixed model f is low, the advertising rate α is low,
and/or buyer irritability by ads β is high. It is when incumbent firms fall in that quadrant
that reactions to ad-sponsored rivals are most critical. And it is in that quadrant that firms
may be confused as to how to fight ad-sponsored rivals.
Our framework also delivers managerial implications for the ad-sponsored entrant. The
entrant may have a product of high or low quality. A higher quality product increases the
chances of successful entry. In addition, absent incumbent reaction, the profit potential for
the entrant is larger when α/β is large. However, the analysis reveals that when α/β is large,
the incumbent will compete through a business model with an ad-sponsored product which
17A second implication from the matrices is that when moving from monopoly to duopoly, mixed business
models are less likely to be optimal. We have elaborated this point in Subsection 6.1.
30
will end up killing the entrant. When α/β is low, however, although the profit potential is
not so great, the incumbent prefers to accommodate entry and both firms coexist.
To see this graphically, Figure 9 superimposes the “attractiveness of the market & like-
lihood of success” continuum onto a two-by-two matrix with dimensions “Quality of the
entrant” and “Advertising rate/Irritation.” We see that when the market is least attractive
to the entrant, its likelihood of success is much larger than when the market is attractive if
the incumbent did not react to the entry. The implication is that ad-sponsored entrants are
condemned to either low profitability or to be pushed out of the market. This observation
seems consistent with the poor profitability that ad-sponsored newspapers have had to date.
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Figure 9: The entrant’s viewpoint.
6.4 Examples revisited
We end this section by examining the responses of a few incumbents in real business situations
in light of our theoretical results.
• The Boston Globe. By taking a significant stake in Metro Boston in 2006, The Boston
Globe effectively switched from a mixed-single-product model to a mixed-product-line-
extension model. This strategy helped The Globe push BostonNow, a free ad-sponsored
entrant launched in 2007, out of the market in less than a year.
The mixed-product-line-extension model appears to be the right business model for
incumbents facing ad-sponsored entrants in the newspaper industry. It is reasonable
to expect that the cost for newspapers to manage the advertiser side, f , is low as
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established newspapers manage relationships with advertisers already. In addition, α
seems to be relatively high. For example, The Boston Globe earns $577 per column
inch on average with an average circulation of 386,415 per day in 2007. Hence, an
advertiser pays about 18 cents per reader for a full-page ad while the newspaper is sold
at 75 cents at the newsstands.18 Moreover, β is likely to be relatively low, as readers
have grown accustomed to having ads in newspapers over the years.
We also observe a similar pattern in Spain. While Metro in Spain was successfully
launched in 2001 and by 2004 had achieved profitability, the competition with Que´!,
an ad-sponsored paper launched in 2005 by Recoletos (a large media group), forced it
to shut down its operation in January 2009.19
These examples are consistent with two predictions of our model. First, the mixed-
product-line-extension model ends up killing the pure ad-sponsored entrant. Second,
the best response to ad-sponsored rivals when α/β is high and f is low is the mixed,
product-line-extension model.
• Apple’s iTunes. Over the past few years a number of players have emerged that dis-
tribute music over the web for free and that earn revenues from advertising only.
Examples include Imeem, Grooveshark, and Spotify. Apple’s iTunes illustrates a sit-
uation where the incumbent’s strategy has been not to respond to the ad-sponsored
entrants; Apple has kept competing through a pure-subscription-based business model,
just as it did before these players entered the market. Moreover, Apple has chosen not
to lower prices.
Our model suggests that one possible reason for inaction is that either α is low or β
is high (or any combination of the two). Our best guess is that the issue for Apple
is that β is too large for it to ever consider including ads in iTunes. Users of iTunes
would likely become irritated if significant numbers of ads where shown on iTunes
(when playing music or movies, for example). Ads would certainly detract from the
slick and polished image that Apple’s products and services have. Ads would not only
have detrimental effects on iTunes’ sales but also on Apple’s other offerings such as
the iPod, the iPhone, and the many models of personal computers that it offers. (We
discuss this reputation effect in Section 8.6.)
18Authors’ calculation based on data from TNS Media Intelligence.
19Source: http://www.spanishnews.es/20090201-free-metro-newspaper-ceases-to-exist-in-spain/
id=195/, accessed April 2009.
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7 Discussion: strategy vs. business model vs. tactics
We have been careful in our use of the expressions strategy, business model, and tactics.
In this section we discuss the three notions in light of the formal model that we have just
analyzed.20
In popular parlance, business model refers to “the logic of the firm, the way it operates
and how it creates value for its stakeholders.” We have operationalized this notion by
calling business model the alternative, discrete profit functions that relate choices (such as
prices or advertising intensities) with payoffs. For example, in the pure-subscription-based
business model, the profit function is piSh = (1− θ∗)ph, and thus the firm earns profits from
subscriptions only, while in the mixed-single-product business model, the profit function
is piMSh = (1 − θ∗)(ph + αAh) − f and the firm earns profits from both subscriptions and
advertising. Because in our formalization different business models correspond to different
profit functions, every business model typically implies different optimal competitive choices
(such as prices or advertising).
The description of a business model is not complete before the tactical choices that are
enabled by the business model are spelled out. Tactics refers to the possible choices open
to a firm by virtue of the business model that it employs. For example, in the pure-ad-
sponsored business model, piAh = αAh, the only possible tactics are concerned with the choice
of advertising intensity, Ah, while in the mixed-product-line extension business model
piMEh =
(1− θ∗)(ph + αAh) + θ∗αA′h − f if qh − βA′2h ≥ ql − βA2l(1− θ∗∗)(ph + αAh)− f otherwise,
and the tactics entail the choice of price and advertising intensity for the high-quality prod-
uct, ph and Ah, and advertising intensity for the low-quality product, A
′
h. Therefore, business
models set the stage for the tactical choices that firms make when interacting in the mar-
ketplace. The implication is that different business models give rise to different tactical
choices and, thus, to tactical interactions of different nature. Specifically, we have seen that
competitive outcomes are different depending on the business model used by the incumbent
and that the optimality of a given business model depends on whether or not there is a
competitor and on the values of the model’s parameters (α, f , β, and qh − ql).
Profit functions are highly simplified, reduced form representations of business models.
20Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2009) offer a discussion of these and related issues based on a framework
derived through inductive grounded theory.
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These stylized representations allow detailed and tight mathematical analyses of optimal
tactical choices for a small number of tactical variables such as price and advertising, which
have been the focus of our paper. We think of profit functions as representations of business
models as if looked at from the distance. We could “zoom down” closer to the actual business
model used by the firm and generate more complex profit functions that explicitly accounted
for additional elements in the business models that we have not considered. For example,
the particular human resource management policies in place, the production technologies
used, or the marketing policies (just to name a few) are all part of “the logic of the firm,
the way it operates and how it creates value for its stakeholders” and, thus, are all part of a
firm’s business model, and could be included in the profit function to have a more detailed
representation of the firm’s business model. However, in most cases, these “closer,” more
complete representations of business models are too complex to be amenable to mathemat-
ical analyses. Depending on the question being studied, the simplifications are justified.
For example, if a researcher is interested in tactical variables such as pricing that are not
expected to interact much with tactical variables not considered (such as compensation poli-
cies or the pool from which talent is hired), then the use of simple profit functions would
seem reasonable. This approach is used in most of the theoretical literature on industrial
organization and its application to strategy. We should point out that this approach can be
quite limiting because, as identified by Porter (1996, p. 68), the object of strategy is “the
creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities;” a unique
business model, in our terminology.
Porter’s (1996) activity systems are richer representations of business models, compared
to the highly stylized profit functions that economic analyses use. The advantage of using
activity systems is that they give a rich picture of “the logic of the firm, the way it operates
and how it creates value for its stakeholders.” Activity systems emphasize that a firm is more
than the mere addition of activities; complementarities may result in important competitive
advantages. On the negative side, activity systems, unlike profit functions, are not amenable
to game theoretical analysis because, in most cases, they are too complex.
Having discussed the concepts of business model and tactics, we are now ready to define
strategy. Loosely speaking, a strategy refers to the choice of business model through which
(tactical) competition will take place. Note that strategy is a high-order choice that has
profound implications on competitive outcomes. Choosing a particular business model means
choosing a particular way to compete, a particular “logic of the firm:” a profit function and
the associated set of possible tactics that will be used to maximize profits in the market
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place. This concept of strategy agrees with Porter’s (1996, p. 68) notion: “strategy is the
creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities.” According
to this definition, the activity system is a reflection of the firm’s strategy. Strategy proper,
however, is not the activity system itself but the creation of the activity system. Likewise, in
our language strategy is concerned with the choice of a business model, and business models
are represented formally through profit functions.
We have loosely defined strategy as a choice of business model. With this definition,
it looks as if one could interchangeably use the notions strategy and business model. For
example, if the firm’s strategy is to choose the mixed-product-line-extension business model,
then we could refer without loss of meaning to the firm’s strategy as a mixed-product-line-
extension strategy. So, what is the difference between strategy and business model? Why
is there a need for the two expressions if they appear to refer to the same thing? We argue
that strategy and business model are different but related concepts and that the strategy
literature would benefit from clearly separating both notions. We will show that in many
competitive situations, equating the two notions can lead to confusion.21 The model that
we have presented in this paper allows us to clearly discriminate between the two concepts.
A strategy is a plan of action as to what business model is to be chosen for the different
situations that might arise. Note that in this definition, a strategy is much more than the
mere selection of a business model; it is a contingent plan of action as to what business
model will be selected, depending on different contingencies that might occur.
To illustrate the difference, we use the formal model of Sections 4 and 5. Suppose first
that there is a monopolist just like the one we have modeled in Section 4, and that there is no
firm that may challenge the monopolist’s turf. Assume that the parameter values are such
that the optimal business model is the mixed-product-line-extension model. In this simple
situation, the notions of business model and strategy coincide: The monopolist competes
through a mixed-product-line-extension business model or, equivalently, the monopolist has
a mixed-product-line-extension strategy. The reason is that in this simple setting, there is
no contingency that may make the monopolist change business models.
Consider now that the monopolist becomes aware that there is a potential entrant, a firm
just as the one modeled in Section 5. A strategy for the monopolist is a complete plan of
action as to what business model it will employ, contingent on the potential entrant’s choice
of whether to enter or not. More concretely, one possible strategy for the monopolist is:
if the potential entrant does not enter, then remain with the mixed-product-line-extension
21We will also see that in the simplest competitive situations, both notions coincide.
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Figure 10: Strategy vs. Business Model vs. Tactics.
business model, but if the potential entrant does enter, then adopt the pure-subscription-
based business model. Figure 10 summarizes the distinction between strategy, business
model, and tactics.
A crucial difference between business models and strategies implied by our conceptualiza-
tion is that while the business model used by a firm is observable, its strategy is typically not
(fully) observed: The only responses (as prescribed by the strategy) that do take place are
those to contingencies that have occurred. For example, the incumbent’s strategy may be:
if the potential entrant does not enter, then remain with the mixed-product-line-extension
business model, but if the potential entrant does enter, then adopt the pure-subscription-
based business model. Suppose that the potential entrant does not enter, then the incumbent
stays put with the mixed-product-line-extension business model and its strategy (the com-
plete plan as to what business model is to be chosen for whatever situation that might arise)
is never fully observed. Put differently, all that we can observe are the equilibrium outcomes
of strategies but not the strategies themselves. Therefore, business models are reflections of
the realized strategy.
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8 Limitations, extensions, and conclusions
We end the paper by discussing some of our main assumptions and by suggesting possible
extensions to the model.
8.1 Higher quality ad-sponsored rivals
We have assumed throughout that the ad-free quality of the incumbent is at least as large
as that of the ad-sponsored rival: qh ≥ ql. An implication of this assumption is that if an
advertising war arises, it is always the incumbent that wins. In addition, in equilibrium, the
incumbent always has the higher quality product. The internet, however, allows the offering
of free high-quality products sponsored by ads. For instance, Google set up GMail as a free
email system supported by advertisements. GMail is a high-quality email system: It offers
an unmatched search capability, over seven gigabytes of free storage space, online and oﬄine
access, and all the bells and whistles that users of paid email systems, such as Microsoft
Outlook or Apple’s Mail, have grown accustomed to.
If we allowed ql > qh, the incumbent could always be pushed out of the market by the
entrant. The reason is that the entrant could always include a number of ads such that its
product would be of higher net quality than that of the incumbent (i.e., set Al such that
ql − βA2l ≥ qh). Interestingly, even if ql > qh, it may be to the entrant’s best interest to
set a number of ads such that ql − βA2l < qh, allowing the incumbent to remain a viable
competitor. This will happen when ql and qh are close. The reason is that in this case, the
only way to kill the incumbent is by having few ads, but given the ad-sponsored business
model, the entrant’s profits are low. The entrant may be better off setting a large number
of ads and end up with a net quality lower than that of the incumbent, ql − βA2l < qh. The
entrant may earn larger profit because its high ql allow it to introduce many ads and its
revenue is proportional to the number of ads.
8.2 Reduced-form advertiser side
While in our model firms may earn profits from both sides of the market (consumers and
advertisers), we have assumed that the advertising rate, α, is fixed and does not depend on
the amount of ads, A. This assumption is motivated by the popularity of pay-per-click or
pay-per-view business models used in the online advertising market today.22 If we assume
22Under these business models, an advertiser pays every time its ad is clicked or viewed by a consumer.
37
that each advertiser generates a profit of α every time its ad is viewed, and also assume that
the advertising market is perfectly competitive (i.e., advertisers are price-takers), then it is
optimal for the firms to charge α to each advertiser for contacting a viewer. In this setting,
the advertising rate charged to each advertiser is indeed independent of the amount of ads.
Similar assumptions have been made before in the literature (e.g., Hansen and Kyhl 2001;
Gabszewicz et al. 2004).
A more complicated model may allow the advertising rates to change with the number
of ads that are being placed. Similar to the negative effect of ads on the users’ utility
(U(θ) = θq − βA2), the advertisers’ willingness to pay for ads is likely to decrease with the
number of ads already in place. An advertiser may be willing to pay a lot if its ad is the
only one in the Boston Globe’s Friday edition. However, if most of the paper is made up of
ads, its willingness to pay for advertising is likely to fall. One could also extend our model
by allowing the incumbent to compete with the entrant for advertisers when the incumbent
uses a mixed business model or a pure-ad-sponsored business model.
Our current model does not take these issues into consideration as our focus has been
on the strategic, rather than the tactical, aspects of the model. To have a tractable model
of strategic choice of business models, we have simplified the tactical interactions on the
advertiser side.23
If we allow the advertising rate to decrease with the amount of ads or allow firm com-
petition on the advertiser side, the incumbent will find it less profitable to introduce ads as
now it is more difficult to earn profits from advertisers. Hence, the incumbent will find entry
deterrence less attractive, while the entrant will still enter albeit its profit will be lower.
8.3 Multiple entrants
Our model can be extended to consider the possible entry of more than one low-quality
ad-sponsored entrant. This was the case, for example, in Spain in the early and mid-2000s.
Metro International launched Metro Spain in March 2001 in a competitive space where
media group Schibsted competed with free newspaper 20 Minutos. And in 2005, media
group Recoletos launched the free newspaper Que´! and Grupo Planeta (a large publishing
house) launched ADN. Therefore, in 2005 there were four(!) free, ad-sponsored newspapers
23As we allow the net quality of the product to decrease with the number of ads, if we assume that
the advertising rate decreases with ads, the profit function will be a cubic function of the number of ads,
making the analysis more complicated. Similarly, allowing the two firms to compete for advertisers will also
significantly complicate the analysis. Indeed, theoretical models on ad-sponsored business models (with the
exception of Reisinger (2004)) often only consider firm competition on the consumer side.
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backed by large media corporations in Spain, making this perhaps the most competitively
crowded market in Europe for ad-sponsored newspapers.
Although we have not dealt explicitly with multiple ad-sponsored entrants in our analysis,
it is easy to examine the main effect. Assume for simplicity that there are two identical low-
quality, ad-sponsored entrants with products l1 and l2 with equal quality (i.e., ql1 = ql2).
In this case, a Bertrand competition argument implies that both entrants are condemned
to zero profits, no matter what the incumbent does. The effect of multiple entrants on the
incumbent is clear also. The increased competition for share, leads to relatively high qualities
for the entrants’ products because when ql1 = ql2, the only possible equilibrium advertising
intensities for the entrants are Al1 = Al2 = 0. The competition between ad-sponsored rivals
in the low-end market is bad news for the incumbent. The higher quality of the entrants’
products make it harder for the incumbent to gain share and its profits could be lower than
if there was one entrant only with a product of quality ql = ql1 = ql2. The incumbent
has a greater incentive to introduce an ad-sponsored product to push the entrants out as
cannibalization with its high-end product is unavoidable. The news for consumers is good,
however, as the average quality of the products could be higher with competition.
8.4 Fondness for advertising
Recall our utility specification: U(θ) = q − βA2. We have assumed that β > 0 to capture
the fact that consumers dislike advertisements: more ads lead to lower utility. If consumers
enjoy ads, then we would have β < 0. To some extent, this may be the case for classifieds
in the newspaper or ads in magazines such as Vogue. When β < 0, the equilibrium tactics
involve A→∞ and consumer utility grows without bound.
While we understand that consumers may like to see some ads, as more and more ads are
shown it gets to a point after which, for most consumers, ads become annoying, irritating,
and exasperating. Clearly, all of our results go through if we interpret qi not as product i’s
quality in the absence of ads but as its quality exactly at the point in which having one more
ad begins to decrease utility (the point at which β becomes positive).
8.5 Vertical vs. horizontal differentiation
In our model, products are vertically differentiated only: All consumers rank the products
equally but have different willingness to pay for them. We do not consider the possibility
of horizontal differentiation, a situation where consumers rank the products differently. Our
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assumption of vertical differentiation between the incumbent and the entrant’s products
is motivated by the phenomena that we study, as in many cases the products offered by
ad-sponsored rivals are of lower quality than those of the incumbents. For example, most
readers would agree that the ad-sponsored newspaper Metro is of lower quality than the
Boston Globe or the New York Times, two newspapers sold at positive price against which
Metro competes. Or the free personal computers that Free-PC gave away,24 were bare-bones
low-end computers of lower quality than the average computer sold by Dell, Compaq, HP,
or IBM at the time.
While our model is motivated by the vertical differentiation observed between incumbent
firms and ad-sponsored rivals, in reality there is always some degree of horizontal differen-
tiation. For example, while most newspaper readers would agree that the Boston Globe is
of higher quality than Metro, a few individuals may be unhappy about the format (page
size and larger number of pages) of the Boston Globe and may still prefer Metro even if the
Boston Globe were given away for free. While this may be the case, as long as the dominant
differentiation between incumbents and ad-sponsored rivals is along the vertical dimension,
our results on strategy should prevail even if both forms of differentiation are considered
jointly in a formal model.
8.6 Reputation effects
One concern that firms may have when considering the use of the mixed-product-line-
extension model is that the offering of a low-quality version of the company’s flagship product
may have adverse effects on the reputation for the high quality product. That is, perceived
quality of the high-end product may be affected by the presence of the low-end, ad-sponsored
version of the product.
Our model can be easily modified to take into account this effect. The most obvious
way to incorporate such reputation concerns is by having qMEh < qh in the profit function
for the mixed-product-line-extension model. Clearly, if the difference between qMEh and qh
is low, our qualitative results remain unchanged. The only difference is that the region
of parameter values for which the mixed-product-line-extension business model is optimal
shrinks. Of course, if the reputation effect is significant (i.e., the difference between q’s is
large), then the mixed-product-line-extension model should never be used in equilibrium.
24Free-PC was the company that kicked off the free PC craze in 1999 by giving away computers with
complementary Internet service and subsidizing the cost through advertising.
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8.7 Multi-homing
A final point that deserves discussion is the issue of multi-homing. In our setting, multi-
homing refers to the possibility that consumers consider consuming one unit of each offering,
the paid product and the free product. There are several ways to introduce multi-homing in
our setting, but perhaps the easiest way is by having each consumer derive separate utilities
for the paid high-quality product and for the free low-quality product and allowing consumers
to consume one unit of each product if they so desire. Mathematically, and individual of
type θ obtains the following utility when consuming the paid product (which is sold at p ≥ 0)
and the free product:
U(θ)paid = θqpaid − βA2paid − p
U(θ)free = θqfree − βA2free.
Consumers will adopt both products if U(θ)paid ≥ 0 and U(θ)free ≥ 0 and obtain a total
utility of U(θ)paid + U(θ)free. In this case, the incumbent will have a strong incentive to
compete through the mixed-product-line-extension model as with multi-homing, there is no
competition, and thus no cannibalization, between its high-quality and low-quality products.
The only reason why the incumbent may not compete through this business model is when f
is too large. Thus, in most instances, the entrant is pushed out when consumers are adopting
both paid and free products.
8.8 Conclusion
Competing through business model reconfiguration is everyday more relevant given the in-
creasing number of opportunities for business model innovations enabled by technological
progress, changes in customer preferences, and deregulation. IBM’s 2006 and 2008 Global
CEO Study,25 for example, show that top management in a broad range of industries are
actively seeking guidance on how to innovate in their business models to improve their ability
to both create and capture value.
We hope that our analysis of strategies to fight ad-sponsored rivals is helpful to researchers
and practitioners willing to consider competition beyond tactics in all sorts of competitive
settings. From a conceptual point of view, the two-period game that we have presented with
firms choosing business models that set the boundaries of the tactical game that follows,
25IBM Global Business Services, “The Global CEO Study 2006,” IBM Corporation, 2006; IBM Global
Business Services, “The Global CEO Study 2008,” IBM Corporation, 2008.
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are applicable to other competitive situations where firms choose strategies to fight low-cost
entrants (Ryanair, Telmore...), open source projects (Linux, Apache...), platform players
(shopping malls, video game systems...), mass customizers (Dell, Timbuk2...), or the like.
The most obvious aspect of our approach to modeling competition through business
models that demands further development is allowing not only the focal firm (the incumbent
in our setting) but also all other industry participants (the entrant in our setting) to choose
business models. The analysis of endogenous business models for all players is technically
challenging as it requires working with best response functions at the business model level, a
construct that is difficult to handle. It is our hope to have provided a solid first step towards
a more general framework for the study of competition through business models.
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Online Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Pure-subscription-based model.
We have θ∗ = ph
qh
. The demand is thus 1−θ∗ = 1− ph
qh
. The monopoly profit is: pih = (1− phqh )ph.
Solving the first-order condition (FOC) w.r.t. ph gives the profit-maximizing price as ph =
qh
2
.
The second order condition (SOC) w.r.t. ph is negative. Therefore, the monopoly profit with
under this business model is piSh =
qh
4
.
Pure-ad-sponsored model.
In this case, the monopolist will introduce as many ads as possible subject to the constraint
that qh − βA2h ≥ 0. Therefore, Ah =
√
qh
β
and the monopoly profit is piAh = α
√
qh
β
.
Mixed-single-product-model.
In this case, the type of the consumer who is indifferent from purchasing and not purchasing
the product, θ∗, is ph
qh−βA2h
. Therefore,
pih = (1− ph
qh − βA2h
)(ph + αAh).
The FOC w.r.t. ph gives:
ph =
1
2
(qh − αAh − βA2h).
We can thus re-write the profit function as
pih =
(qh + Ah(α− βAh))2
4(qh − βA2h)
.
The FOC w.r.t. Ah implies that Ah solves the equation A
3
hβ
2 + qh(α− Ahβ) = 0.
Mixed-product-line-extension-model.
The indifferent consumer between h and h′ is determined by: θ∗(qh − βA2h)− ph = β∗(qh −
βA′2h ). Hence, θ
∗ = ph
β(A′2h −A2h)
. It is important to note that for both products to be active,
we need
√
qh
β
≥ A′h > Ah. The profit is:
piMEh = (1−
ph
β(A′2h − A2h)
)(ph + αAh) +
ph
β(A′2h − A2h)
(αA′h)− f (1)
i
The monopolist maximizes pih by setting ph, Ah and A
′
h. The FOC w.r.t. ph gives:
ph =
1
2
(A′h − Ah)(α + β(Ah + A′h)).
Hence θ∗ = 1
2
(1 + α
β(Ah+A
′
h)
). For θ∗ ∈ [0, 1], we need Ah + A′h ≥ αβ . We then substitute ph
into the profit function and obtain:
piMEh =
1
4
(
2α(Ah + A
′
h) + (1−
2Ah
Ah + A′h
)
α2
β
+ β(A′2h − A2h)
)
− f. (2)
It is easy to see that piMEh increases in A
′
h. We conclude that the monopolist will set A
′
h to
the maximum. Hence, A′h =
√
qh
β
.
We then take FOC of equation (2) w.r.t. Ah and solve for optimal Ah. We have:
Ah = −A
′
h
2
+
√
A′h
√
4α + βA′h
2
√
β
=
−√qh + ( qhβ )
1
4
√
4α +
√
βqh
2
√
β
. (3)
Hence,
θ∗ =
1
2
+
α
√
β
(√
qh + (
qh
β
)
1
4
√
4α +
√
βqh
) .
For the solution to be interior, we need θ∗ = 1
2
(1 + α
β(Ah+A
′
h)
) ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, we need
α ≤ 2√βqh. Under this condition, the SOC of piMEh w.r.t. Ah is negative. Substituting the
expressions of Ah and A
′
h into equation (2), we obtain the profit:
piMEh =
2α3 +
(
9
√
βqh − 5 4
√
βqh
√
4α +
√
βqh
)
α2 + 2αβqh + (βqh)
5/4
(√
4α +
√
βqh +
4
√
βqh
)
4β
(
−2α +√βqh + 4
√
βqh
√
4α +
√
βqh
) −f.
When α > 2
√
βqh, only the ad-sponsored product is active and the business model
effectively becomes an ad-sponsored model.
Proof of Lemma 1. Under the mixed-single-product model, the optimal amount of Ah is
given by A3hβ
2 + qh(α−Ahβ) = 0. It is easy to see that as long as α > 0, the optimal Ah is
greater than 0. Hence, the profit from the mixed-single-product model when f = 0 has to
be greater than the one from the pure-subscription-based model as otherwise the monopolist
could set Ah = 0 to earn larger profit. Hence, the mixed-single-product model dominates
the pure-subscription-based model. From Lemma 2, we know that the mixed-product-line-
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extension model dominates the mixed-single-product model. Hence, when f = 0, the pure-
subscription-based model is dominated by the two mixed models.
Proof of Lemma 2. Under the mixed-single-product-model, a consumer with type θ
receives utility θ(qh − βA2h)− ph. Hence, for consumers with θ < phqh−βA2h , they do not adopt
the product. The monopolist could increase its profit by offering a second product with
A′h =
√
qh
β
number of ads and these non-adopters will adopt this ad-sponsored product and
ad revenue will accrue. The demand for the first product remains unchanged. Hence, the
monopolist can always earn more profit with the mixed-product-line-extension strategy.
Proof of Lemma 3. As the mixed-single-product model is dominated, we only need to con-
sider the other three models. We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that when α > 2
√
βqh,
the mixed-product-line-extension model effectively becomes the pure-ad-sponsored model.
We also know that piSh =
qh
4
and piAh = α
√
qh
β
. It is easy to see that when α >
√
βqh
4
, piAh > pi
S
h .
Hence, when α > 2
√
βqh, the pure-ad-sponsored model is the optimal business model. Sim-
ilarly, when α <
√
βqh
4
, the pure-subscription-based model dominates the pure-ad-sponsored
model.
Proof of Lemma 4. When α is low, we only need to consider the pure-subscription-
based model and the mixed-product-line-extension model as the pure-ad-sponsored model
is dominated by the pure-subscription-based model as shown in Lemma 3. We know that
piMEh increases with α, as the monopolist could at minimum keep ph, Ah and A
′
h at the
same level and gain more profit. Hence, piMEh increases with α and decreases with f . We
also know that when α is zero, the mixed-product-extension model effectively becomes a
pure-subscription-based model. Therefore, given a level of f , when α is sufficiently low, the
pure-subscription-based model is better than the mixed-product-line-extension model.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Pure-subscription-based model.
Under the subscription-based model, θ∗ = ph
qh−ql+βA2l
. The FOC condition of the profit func-
tion, piSh = (1 − θ∗)ph, gives the optimal price of product h, ph = 12(qh − ql + βA2l ) and the
SOC is negative.
The FOC condition of the profit function, piSl = αθ
∗Al, gives the optimal amount of ads
of product l, Al =
√
qh−ql
β
and the SOC is negative.
iii
The constraint that ql − βA2l ≥ 0 gives Al ≤
√
ql
β
.
Therefore, when qh < 2ql, we have an interior solution. In this case, Al =
√
qh−ql
β
.
Substituting it to the expression of equilibrium ph, we have ph = qh − ql. Hence, piSh = qh−ql2
and piSl =
α
2
√
qh−ql
β
.
When qh ≥ 2ql, we have a corner solution. In this case, Al =
√
ql
β
. Thus, ph =
qh
2
,
piSh =
qh
4
and piSl =
α
2
√
ql
β
.
Pure-ad-sponsored model.
Under the ad-sponsored model, there is always an incentive to maximize the number of ads
because all consumers buy and more profit is generated from advertisers as the number of ads
grow. If qh−βA2h < ql, then the entrant will choose a small Al such that qh−βA2h < ql−βA2l
and get all the demand. The best response for the incumbent is to decrease Ah. Then the
entrant will decrease Al. This process ends when qh − βA2h = ql.
Hence, the equilibrium amount of ads for the incumbent is Ah =
√
qh−ql
β
. All consumers
purchase product h. Hence, the profit of the incumbent is α
√
qh−ql
β
. The entrant receives no
demand and thus no profit.
Mixed-single-product model.
We begin by finding the indifferent consumer between h and l. Its type is θ∗ = ph
qh−ql−βA2h+βA2l
.
Profit for the incumbent is
piMSh = (1−
ph
qh − ql − βA2h + βA2l
)(ph + αAh)− f.
The FOC of piMSh w.r.t. ph gives ph =
1
2
(qh − ql − αAh − βA2h + βA2l ). Substituting ph
into the profit function, we have:
piMSh =
(qh − ql + αAh + β(A2l − A2h))2
4(qh − ql + β(A2l − A2h))
− f (4)
We can then take FOC w.r.t. Ah and obtain
A2l +
qh − ql
β
=
A3h
Ah − α/β . (5)
The entrant profit is
piMSl =
ph
qh − ql − βA2h + βA2l
αAl.
iv
Hence, its best response function is
Al =
√
qh − ql − βA2h
β
. (6)
The SOC for Al is always negative. We also need ql − βA2l ≥ 0, i.e., Al <
√
ql
β
. Hence,
when qh ≤ 2ql,
√
qh−ql−βA2h
β
≤
√
ql
β
and we always have an interior solution. In this case, we
could solve equations (5) and (6) for Ah and Al, and obtain the expressions for equilibrium
profits piMSh and pi
MS
l .
When qh > 2ql, we may have a corner solution: this happens when Al computed from
equation (6) is greater than
√
ql
β
. When we are at a corner, Al =
√
ql
β
and Ah is solved by
equation (5).
Mixed-product-line-extension model.
The incumbent maximizes piMEh by setting ph, Ah and A
′
h. The FOC w.r.t. ph gives:
ph =
1
2
(A′h − Ah)(α + β(Ah + A′h)).
Hence θ∗ = 1
2
(1 + α
β(Ah+A
′
h)
). We then substitute ph into the profit function and obtain:
piMEh =
1
4
(
2α(Ah + A
′
h) + (1−
2Ah
Ah + A′h
)
α2
β
+ β(A′2h − A2h)
)
− f. (7)
It is easy to see that pih increases in A
′
h. We conclude that the incumbent will set A
′
h to the
maximum. The upper bound of A′h is imposed by ql. Hence, A
′
h =
√
qh−ql
β
.
We then take the FOC of equation (7) w.r.t. Ah and solve for optimal Ah. We have:
Ah = −A
′
h
2
+
√
A′h
√
4α + βA′h
2
√
β
=
−√qh − ql + ( qh−qlβ )
1
4
√
4α +
√
β(qh − ql)
2
√
β
. (8)
Hence,
θ∗ =
1
2
+
α
√
β
(√
qh − ql + ( qh−qlβ )
1
4
√
4α +
√
β(qh − ql)
) .
For the solution to be interior, we need θ∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, we need α ≤ 2√β(qh − ql).
v
Substituting the expressions of Ah and A
′
h into equation (7), we obtain the profit for firm h:
piMEh = (2α
3 + (9
√
β(qh − ql)− 5 4
√
β(qh − ql)
√
4α +
√
β(qh − ql))α2 + 2αβ(qh − ql) +
(β(qh − ql))5/4(
√
4α +
√
β(qh − ql) + 4
√
β(qh − ql)))/(
4β(−2α +
√
β(qh − ql) + 4
√
β(qh − ql)
√
4α +
√
β(qh − ql))
)
− f
The profit expression is the same as in the mixed-product-line-extension model of the mo-
nopolist except that we now have qh − ql instead of qh.
When α > 2
√
β(qh − ql), only the ad-sponsored product is active and it has demand of
1. Hence, the business model effectively becomes an ad-sponsored model.
In both cases, the entrant is pushed out of the market.
Proof of Lemma 5. When we have corner solutions, Al =
√
ql
β
, the profit function (i.e.,
equation (4)) can be simplified to:
piMSh =
(qh + Ah(α− βAh))2
4 (qh − βA2h)
− f.
The FOC of piMSh w.r.t. Ah gives:
α =
Ahqhβ − A3hβ2
qh
.
Thus,
dAh
dα
= 1/
dα
dAh
=
qh
qhβ − 3A2hβ2
.
We then differentiate piMSh w.r.t. α, taking into consideration that Ah, the equilibrium ad
intensity, is a function of α. We have:
dpih
dα
=
(qh + αAh − βA2h)
(
qhα
dAh
dα
+ βA3h
(−1 + β dAh
dα
)
+ Ah
(
qh − qhβ dAhdα
))
2 (qh − βA2h)2
.
Substituting the expression for dAh
dα
into the above expression, we have:
dpih
dα
=
(qh + αAh − βA2h) (q2hα− 3qhβ2A3h + 3β3A5h)
2β (qh − 3βA2h) (qh − βA2h)2
.
vi
Using conditions such as qh > βA
2
h and α =
Ahqhβ−A3hβ2
qh
, we could show that dpih
dα
> 0. There-
fore, when we have the corner solution, the incumbent profit increases with the advertising
rate.
We now proceed to examining the interior case following a similar approach. In the
interior case, Ah and Al are the solutions of a system of two equations:(qh − ql)/β + A2l =
A3h
Ah−α/β
Al = ((qh − ql − A2hβ)/β)1/2
.
Substituting the expression of Al from the second equation to the first equation and
solving for α, we have:
α =
2βAh(qh − ql − βA2h)
2(qh − ql)− βA2h
. (9)
Thus,
dAh
dα
= 1/
dα
dAh
=
(2(qh − ql)− βA2h)2
2β (2(qh − ql)2 − 5(qh − ql)βA2h + β2A4h)
. (10)
We can also substitute the expression for Al into equation (4), the profit function of the
incumbent:
piMSh =
(2(qh − ql) + Ah(α− 2Ahβ))2
8 (qh − ql − βA2h)
− f.
We note that Ah here is the equilibrium ad intensity and is a function of α. We now
differentiate piMSh w.r.t. α and obtain:
dpiMSh
dα
=
(2(qh − ql) + Ah(α− 2βAh))
(
(qh − ql)αdAhdα + βA3h
(−1 + 2β dAh
dα
)
+ (qh − ql)Ah
(
1− 2β dAh
dα
))
4 ((qh − ql)− βA2h)2
We then substitute dAh
dα
into the above equation and obtain:
dpiMSh
dα
=
(qh − ql)(2(qh − ql) + Ah(α− 2βAh))
8β(qh − ql − βA2h)2(2(qh − ql)2 − 5(qh − ql)βA2h + β2A4h)
×(
4(qh − ql)2α + βAh(−4(qh − ql)2 + Ah(−4(qh − ql)α + βAh(2(qh − ql) + Ah(α + 2βAh))))
)
.
We check the sign for each component in the above expression. We find that except
(4(qh − ql)2α + βAh(−4(qh − ql)2 + Ah(−4(qh − ql)α + βAh(2(qh − ql) + Ah(α + 2βAh))))), the
four other terms: (qh− ql), (2(qh− ql)+Ah(α−2βAh)), 8β(qh− ql−βA2h)2 and (2(qh− ql)2−
5(qh − ql)βA2h + β2A4h) are all positive. Hence, we conclude that dpihdα is negative.
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Therefore, when we have interior solutions, the incumbent profit decreases with the ad-
vertising rate.
We now show that when qh < 2ql, we always have interior solutions. We have interior
solutions if Al = ((qh − ql − βA2h)/β)1/2 < (ql/β)1/2. That is:
qh − βA2h < 2ql.
We know that in equilibrium Ah > 0. Hence, this condition is always satisfied. Hence, we
always have interior solutions when qh < 2ql.
We now show that when qh > 2ql and α is small, we always have corner solutions. We
have corner solutions when
qh − βA2h > 2ql.
Consider the case where α = 0. In this case, the business model is equivalent to the pure-
subscription-based model and we know when qh > 2ql, we have corner solutions. Now
consider when α = , a very small positive number. From equations (9) and (10), we have
when α→ 0: Ah → 0 and dAhdα = 1/β. Hence, Ah = /β. We can always find a small enough
 such that when qh > 2ql, qh − βA2h = qh − β(/β)2 = qh − 2/β > 2ql. Hence, we know
when α < α∗ = , we are at the corner.
Proof of Lemma 6. It is easy to see that when α is small, the pure-subscription-
based model is better than pure-ad-sponsored model. We now compare the profit from the
pure-subscription-based model to the mixed-product-line-extension model. When α → 0,
piMEh → qh−ql4 − f . We also know that
dpiMEh
dα
=
3((qh − ql)β)1/4
√
4α +
√
(qh − ql)β − 2α−
√
(qh − ql)β
4β
,
which is positive when α < 2
√
β(qh − ql). Hence, we know that piMEh increases from qh−ql4 −f
as α increases. The profit from the pure-subscription-based model, piSh , does not change with
α and is either qh−ql
2
or qh
4
. In either case, piSh >
qh−ql
4
− f . Hence, when α is small, the
pure-subscription-based model provides more profit than the mixed-product-line-extension
model. We also know that when qh ≤ 2ql, the pure-subscription-based model is better than
the mixed-single-product model. Hence, in this case, when α is small, the pure-subscription-
based model is the best model among the four. When qh > ql and α is small, the mixed-
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single-product model is better than the pure-subscription-based model. Hence, the mixed-
single-product model is the best model among the four. Therefore, when α is small, either
the pure-subscription-based or the mixed-single-product model is optimal.
The second part is straightforward. As α increases, in both the mixed-single-product
model and the mixed-product-line-extension model, the optimal price of the high quality
product decreases. At some point, the incumbent is willing to give the product away for free
and make money exclusively from ads. It is also easy to see that with a big α, the profit from
the pure-ad-sponsored model is greater than the one from pure-subscription-based model.
Hence, when α is sufficiently large, the optimal business model is the pure-ad-sponsored
model.
Proof of Lemma 7. The simplest way to show this is to provide an example in which
the pure-subscription-based model is better than the mixed-single-product model and the
mixed-product-line-extension model. Consider the case in which qh = 3, ql = 1.6, α = 0.4,
β = 1 and f = 0. We have piSh = 0.7, pi
A
h = 0.473, pi
MS
h = 0.696 and pi
ME
h = 0.648. Hence,
the pure-subscription-based model is the best among the four even in the case where f = 0.
Proof of Lemma 8. As the example in the proof of Lemma 7 shows, piMSh could be
greater than piMEh . Hence, the mixed-product-line-extension model no longer dominates the
mixed-single-product model.
Proof of Lemma 9. It is easy to see that when α is sufficiently large, piAh = α
√
qh−ql
β
will be greater than piSh , which is
qh−ql
2
or qh
4
depending on the relative size of qh and ql.
Similarly, in the mixed-single-product model, as α increases, Ah will increase and Al will
eventually decrease (it could be at the corner initially). Hence, ph will decrease. When α is
sufficiently large, ph becomes zero and effectively we have a pure-ad-sponsored model. In the
mixed-product-line-extension model, we know when α >
√
β(qh − ql), the model becomes a
pure-ad-sponsored model. Hence, when α is sufficiently large, the optimal business model is
the pure-ad-sponsored model.
As the additional cost f is only introduced in the mixed models, we know that when f
is sufficiently large, only the pure business models can be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proposition follows straightly from Lemma 5. Consider the
mixed-single-product model. When qh ≤ 2ql, we are always at the interior and piMSh decreases
ix
with α. Hence, the incumbent will earn more profit if α = 0. In other words, the profit from
the pure-subscription-based model will be higher. Thus, the mixed-single-product model is
always dominated by the pure-subscription-based model (even if f = 0). As a result, we
may only have three optimal business models, as shown in Figure 2.
When qh > 2ql, we know that when α is small, we are at the corner and pi
MS
h increases
with α. Hence, in this case, when f is small, piMSh will be greater than pi
S
h , the profit from the
pure-subscription-based model. Therefore, there is always a region in which the mixed-single-
product model is better than the pure-subscription-based model and is thus not dominated.
As illustrated in Figure 3, indeed all four business models may be optimal.
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